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ABSTRACT
ANDREW MARK HAYES: The Future Was a Riot: Causes of Youth Unemployment in
Spain and Challenges to Immigration and the Welfare State in the Era of the Common
Market (1999-2016)
(Under the direction of Joshua Hendrickson)
The purpose of this thesis is to exam the causes behind unusually high youth
unemployment in Spain, even after the 2007-8 financial crisis has subsided. The primary
means of investigating these causes is through constructing a set of empirical models and
then using these models to perform several time-series regressions to find whether changes
in educational patterns, demographics, and immigration have had any concrete effect on
the youth unemployment rate and social capital. Some qualitative work is done; particularly
in describing the legal structure surrounding unemployment and in the description of the
Spanish welfare state. In my research, I find that a change in educational patterns does not
deeply impact youth unemployment, nor do demographic shifts. The collapse of the
Spanish economy (in particular the housing market) has had a far more determinative effect
than any of these factors named. Levels of immigration do bear a positive relationship with
youth unemployment, but only for a period, and have no measurable effect on social capital
and may in fact aid social cohesion to a small degree, given enough time. In conclusion,
the causes of high Spanish youth unemployment are not being dealt with well by the present
government and further research into this area (particularly in to the effects of reforms
undertaken in 2010 and 2012) is warranted before any policy prescriptions are formulated.
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Introduction

Beginning in 2007, the global financial market collapsed, destroying livelihoods,
evaporating pension funds, and leaving dozens of economies languishing in a decade-long
recession. As economists and politicians cautiously autopsy global structures that led to
the collapse, it is clear that some countries have bounced back, a few even performing
better now than they did prior to the crisis. However, the wide majority of European
countries have barely staggered away from the economic wreckage of the late-2000s. One
case in which this is particularly true has been that of Spain.
A full decade after the beginning of the crisis, unemployment rates in Spain still
hover above 20%, second only to Greece among EU members. Youth fare even worse in
the country, with national youth unemployment standing at 48.8%, coming third in the EU
after Greece and Italy. For the purposes of this analysis, youth unemployment is defined
as the percentage of those under the age of thirty who are seeking work but are unable to
secure it, the definition used by the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security.
In some regions of Spain, such as the rural province of Extremadura in the west, youth
unemployment has soared to nearly 70% (Alonso and Masot, 2017). Even as greater
distance is put between the events of the crisis and the present day, these unemployment
rates remain well above what would be expected in a healthy economy.
It is clear that Spain’s ineffective labor market is fast becoming a structural problem
as higher youth unemployment has become the “new normal.” However, Spain’s exorbitant
youth unemployment, almost unmatched in its deterioration in the last ten years, begs the
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question: why has youth unemployment in Spain become such a chronic structural
problem?
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Figure 1: Youth unemployment rate in Spain, compared with those of other nations
This thesis proposes that Spanish cultural and policy changes have resulted in a
situation in which Spanish youth are in the unenviable position of being both undertrained
for the modern globalized marketplace while being poorly fitted for jobs available in Spain.
In addition, I posit that these changes in the Spanish youth labor market bear the markers
of economic hysteresis and these changes represent structural deficiencies that will persist
after the initial causes are removed.
In order to accomplish this, I present Spain in its appropriate historical and
geographical context as a young democracy located in Southern Europe. Spain’s unique
historical transition from relatively-poor dictatorship to first-world democracy with
attendant social benefits structure, bypassing the slow growth of the economy along with
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social institutions observed in the rest of Western Europe, has brought about unique
challenges that inform the present Spanish economic situation. In addition, cultural forces,
such as demographic change and immigration, which guide youth decisions are analyzed.
In understanding the dynamics and flaws that have resulted in such a dire situation for
Spain, we may gain greater understanding into the causes and effects of youth
unemployment in advanced countries.
Methodology
The methodology employed consists of both quantitative and qualitative
approaches. The backbone of this thesis’ quantitative analysis is time-series regressions of
the youth unemployment rate on various independent variables that my hypotheses claim
as potential causes of the Spanish youth unemployment problem, then tabulating the
correlation between explanatory variables and youth unemployment. More specifically, I
employ empirical analysis in order to negate some of the uncertainties associated with the
kind of time-series data constituted by unemployment figures, in which it is difficult to
ascertain whether or not a set of variables, both independent and dependent, are highly
collinear or not.
In addition, I engage with existing arguments made regarding the structure of the
Spanish welfare state. In doing so, I construct arguments to explain some non-quantifiable
elements in the persistence of high unemployment among young Spaniards, even though
such arguments will certainly not constitute the backbone of my research. Because this is
my goal, I will focus on Spanish secondary sources (both in English and Spanish) in order
to gain a better understanding of the cultural dynamics contributing to Spanish conceptions
of and attitudes toward joblessness.
3

Literature Review
A significant wealth of literature already exists regarding the phenomenon of youth
unemployment. A wide number of writers have informed and inspired the particular
research question of this thesis. A series of studies conducted by Blanchflower and
Freeman describe the prevalence of youth joblessness in late-stage capitalist countries. This
research has been compiled in their book Youth Unemployment and Joblessness in
Advanced Countries. A study by Gugliemo Caporale carried out for the OECD and the
Italian Ministry of Labor from 2014 has been instructional in its attempts to explain the
persistence of youth unemployment in European models. Extensive research has also been
carried out by Dietrich and Möller on the connection between European business cycles
and youth unemployment. I have also drawn upon the works of a 2015 study by Stephen
Sacht regarding the broader Spanish labor puzzle and his analysis of the effects of labor
market reforms in 2010 and 2012. A 2011 study on assimilation and unemployment with
regards to immigrants in Spain by Silva and Vázquez-Grinno has been valuable in the
construction of questions regarding the problems caused and faced by immigrants to Spain.
In addition, the book The New Generations of Europeans, edited by Wolfgang Lutz, has
been useful in understanding the need for and public attitudes concerning mass
immigration in the modern period. Beyond these more purely academic sources, I have
also drawn upon the data and analysis of periodic surveys conducted by the EU and the
OECD, as well as the World Values Survey.
A consistent missing element of these studies has been a lack of specific focus into
Spanish youth unemployment; most of the studies listed above have focused on broader
questions of unemployment in the country or of youth unemployment in Europe as a whole.
4

These studies, where they do focus on youth unemployment, often neglect to consider the
factors across time that may have had a consequential effect on the employment situation
of Spanish youth. To solve this problem, I study a range of potential causes for the youth
unemployment crisis in modern Spain.
Chapter Outline
Chapter I details the construction and composition of the Spanish welfare state,
beginning in the 1960s and continuing to the modern day. The main thrust of this chapter’s
analysis lies in determining what effect the structure of the Spanish welfare state has
contributed to the Spanish youth joblessness situation. Necessary historical context
concerning the fall of Franco’s nationalist dictatorship and its corollary central planning
are inserted as they are relevant to the discussion of Spain’s unique approach to the social
safety net, but the primary purpose of this chapter is not to simply reconstruct the existing
general history of this era. An additional analysis focuses on the efficiency of labor market
reforms adopted in 2010 and 2012. In this chapter I find that some disadvantages are
presented by the welfare state to young workers and that it is difficult to ascertain the results
of reform efforts with data extending only through 2016.
Following Chapter I, Chapter II focuses on the effects of Spanish demographics on
the unemployment problem, testing the hypothesis that the declining birth rate in Spain has
resulted in fewer new businesses being created and a drop-off in entrepreneurship. In order
to test this hypothesis, I use data regarding birth rates and data obtained from Spain’s
National Institute of Statistics regarding the number of new licenses filed for businesses
every year in the country and the part-time employment rate among young people. In this

5

chapter I find that the demographic shift in birthrates have not impacted economic
development in any significant way.
In Chapter III, I explore the impact of education on the Spanish youth labor
situation on two fronts. First, I test the hypothesis that inadequate training and education at
the secondary level has produced a generation of Spanish workers unprepared to deal with
the challenges of the modern global labor market. In order to test youth preparedness, I will
use as variables Spanish PISA scores (internationally standardized tests measuring
academic performance) and English-language acquisition, regressing these variables on
youth unemployment. Secondly, I test the hypothesis that higher levels of university
education have widened the gap between available jobs and the jobs for which university
graduates are trained. In order to test this hypothesis, I use as an explanatory variable the
percentage of students in majors divided by discipline (social sciences, hard sciences,
humanities, etc.) over time. In this way, I find that reduced spending at the secondary level
harms students’ employment chances and that this effect carries across sectors of the
economy, though students who study STEM fields generally carry better odds of
employment.
In Chapter IV, I discuss the impact of youth unemployment in Spain in the areas of
immigration. Much attention in Spanish media has been devoted to the effects of largescale immigration from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa into the country and attendant
problems caused in the job market. I use this chapter to dissect the actual effects of
immigration by comparing rates of immigration with youth unemployment rates. I also
observe and measure the effect that immigration has had on social capital and what effect
this might carry for young workers and the struggles that they face in seeking meaningful
6

employment. In this chapter, I find that immigration has some small and temporary effect
on youth unemployment but no effect on social capital.
Following this final chapter, a brief conclusion sums up the findings of the prior
chapters. Through this thesis, I hope to add to existing knowledge regarding the broader
Southern European labor puzzle and to enhance understanding of the specific complexities
and tendencies of Spanish youth unemployment and the effects that this labor market
phenomenon have had on the country’s immigration patterns and welfare state.
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Chapter I
The Legal Status of Unemployment in Spain and Challenges Posed by the Welfare
State
Introduction
Before launching into the analysis of data regarding changes in youth
unemployment brought about by changes in Spanish society and educational patterns, it is
useful to examine the legal nexus that surrounds labor and unemployment in the Spanish
state and, by extension, informs one aspect of the unemployment situation experienced by
young people. It is no secret that the legal particularity of unemployment can deeply impact
the choices made by both jobseekers and potential employers (Peinado and Serrano, 2017).
In order to analyze what effects the legal recognition of and provision for the unemployed
may have on youth unemployment, it is key to describe both the motivating factors
experienced by young people as well as the incentives presented to businesses within a
labor market.
Similarly, it is impossible to discuss the specific structures and practices of a nation
with regard to welfare systems and unemployment protections without first locating these
aspects within their historical and geographical context. Understanding the common
problems of economic crisis and unemployment across a region (in Spain’s case, that of
Southern Europe) is helpful in both identifying the common traits that shape these issues
as well as seeking out potential solutions to such problems that would function within a
8

specific cultural milieu (Contini, 2012). To that end, some significant cross-national
comparison is necessary to diagnose the inadequacies that undermine Spanish efforts to
curb job loss by reforms made to the welfare state. In this way, it will be possible to gain a
fuller picture of pressures facing Spanish youth.
Theoretical Framework of the Spanish Welfare State
Compared to some of the more ample European benefits systems, such as the
Nordic model, the provisions of the Spanish welfare state with regard to unemployment
have been less extensively studied (Guogis, 2012). Historically speaking, the Spanish
welfare state was underdeveloped by European standards (Pons and Rodríguez, 2012). The
development of a social safety net that took place in the early twentieth century in Britain
and Scandinavia did not come about in Spain until the 1960s and did not reach its full
flowering until the 1980s (Royo, 234). Much of this could be attributed to the fact that
Franco’s dictatorship granted little of the democratic impetus to court voters with welfare
spending that was observed in other nations at the same time (Castles and Obinger, 2008).
Anti-Communist leanings and a Spanish society that still leaned heavily on the Catholic
Church as its primary means of social support also influenced this calculus (Castles, 1994).
It was not until the socialist governments of Felipe González (1982-1996) that social
spending began to swell in Spain as a percentage of GDP, eventually coming to eclipse that
of Spain’s northern neighbors (Moreno, 149).
Despite the relative lack of intense study into the Spanish welfare state, it is
important to locate the Spanish welfare state’s governing philosophy within a theoretical
framework at the outset, with which it will be possible to analyze subsequent changes and
reforms to the Spanish unemployment system according to the framework. Most scholars
9

agree that the Spanish approach to welfare is not the full-throated socialist egalitarianism
observed in, say, Sweden, but rather a via media dubbed ‘conservative corporatism’
(Moreno and Sarasa, 1992). Hallmarks of this structural philosophy involve a system of
welfare benefits that is tied to one’s status as a worker, pronounced income differentials,
hierarchy among workers, a moderate provision of social rights, and a degree of social
exclusion (Maguire et. al., 364). This philosophy often manifests itself through a deep
reliance on transfer payments as a means of redistributing wealth.
Spain belongs to a specific family of nations whose approach to the provision of
social welfare does not match the typical image of European welfare. This group of
Southern European nations (defined for the purposes of analysis as Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain) are united by historical backgrounds, values systems, and institutional
peculiarities. The researcher Maurizio Ferrera describes the Southern welfare state as
having the following characteristics: (1) a highly fragmented and 'corporatist' income
maintenance system, displaying a marked internal polarization (such as generous pensions
accompanied by macroscopic gaps of protection), (2) a departure from corporatist
traditions in the field of health care and the establishment (at least partially) of National
Health Services based on universalistic principles, (3) a low degree of state penetration of
the welfare sphere and a highly collusive mix between public and non-public actors and
institutions, and (4) the persistence of clientelism and – in some cases – selective
distribution of subsidies (Ferrera, 1996). Ferrera also suggests some factors to explain these
peculiarities of the Southern model. Among these are the historical weakness of the state
apparatus in this area of Europe, a history of authoritarian rule and ideological polarizations
following democratization, in particular, the presence of a fractured Left in these countries.
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It is possible to observe shared features of their welfare states that are applicable to
the cases of Spanish youth. One important common trait is the division of workers within
Southern economies into the categories of core workers, peripheral workers, and marginal
workers (González and Miles-Touya, 2010). Core workers are specialized workers who
enjoy significant protection from the risk of unemployment, such as doctors, lawyers,
academics, and so forth. Peripheral workers are gainfully employed and educated workers
with some protection against unemployment, but whose skills are not specialized and may
be shifted among industries (such as an accountant). Finally, marginal workers are
unskilled workers who primarily work on a temporary basis (not on contracts) and are
consistently threatened by unemployment. For young workers in the Spanish case, moving
into the realm of core workers is a persisting challenge, especially as specialized fields
have become crowded in the last years (Parellada et. al., 2009).
The Spanish Contract System
The most important concept in Spanish labor law is that of the employment
contract. The vast majority of salaried Spanish workers are employed on a contract of a
fixed length and the procurement of such a contract is considered to be one of the hallmarks
of middle-class economic achievement in Spanish society. The breach or rupture of a
contract is considered to be a serious infraction and is typically met with a strong reprisal
or penalty delivered to the offending party. This system of contract employment, designed
to offer some level of protection to Spain’s growing cohort of white-collar workers, has its
origins in the late 1960s and the economic populism espoused by the Franco regime
(Palomares, 184). For years after its introduction, this system was lauded as a major step
forward for Spanish professional workers.
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However, in recent years, louder criticisms of this system have arisen, particularly
among young people. As Spain has transitioned to a service-based economy, the number
of people seeking permanent contracts has dramatically increased. Young professionals in
Spain often enter into the workforce by working a temporary contract (typically of three
years) that offers fewer benefits and salary guarantees than a full-time contract offered to
more senior employees. Typically, full unemployment insurance is not offered to those
employed by a temporary contract (de Cuyper et. al., 2009). Because of this, young people
who are unable to secure a permanent contract following their first contracted period are
less well-protected. Following the financial crisis, some politicians have grown concerned
about the high potential for labor market rigidity created by the contract system, as well as
the discomfort experienced by young workers, and have opted for reform.
The Spanish Pension System
Additionally, the pensions systems within the Southern model differ significantly
from other European models in that it relies more heavily on transfer payments from young
workers to their retired counterparts (Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra, 2017). In other
words, active labor market participants finance the benefits accruing to their parents,
benefits that are often more comfortable than those enjoyed by workers elsewhere in
Europe (Hughes, 49). While this setup is certainly not unusual, it is the generosity of this
arrangement that has proven troublesome for new workers.
For young workers in the Spanish state, this welfare system has several negative
features. In the first place, it prioritizes and to some degree “overprotects” pensioners from
the hazards of old age at the expense of younger workers. In a country such as Spain that
is experiencing a rapid aging of its population, the demographic forecast bodes poorly for
12

young workers, as they are required to subsidize the pensions of more retirees. Secondly,
the heavy concentration of government spending on income maintenance programs has
drawn away from other government programs that constitute a better-rounded social
welfare state in other European countries, such as family benefits and services and public
housing (Brie, 101). These commonplace programs remained underdeveloped in Spain by
European standards and may be unavailable to young jobseekers as a means of support.
Finally, since the passage of the Non-Contributionary Pensions Act in 1990, Spain has
taken a universalized approach to pensions and disability payments, regardless of income
(Holzmann et. al., 2003). This is similar to what was present in much of Northern Europe
until reforms were made to make their pension systems sounder, a step that has not yet
been taken in Spain.
All of these factors place the modern young Spanish jobseeker in a catch-22
situation. For a mostly-educated young workforce that has attended university and
subsequently attempts to join the workforce, the choice of employment may be
unappealing. A skilled young worker who accepts a job will be forced to make a deep
contribution to the pensions of less-skilled and older workers, an option some young people
find less attractive than unemployment (Hill, 102). In addition, some significant doubt
likely lingers in the minds of many young workers as to whether or not they will ever
receive the retirement benefits they contribute toward now. This doubt warrant some
hesitation before accepting a job on the mere reasoning that that money will provide for
the same young workers in their own retirements. For some workers, this subtraction from
their pay to fund an elusive retirement may be enough to cause them to pass on the first job
offered to them.
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For young people with solid family support and little debt, there is some economic
sense in holding out for better-paid work in their field. However, the Spanish welfare state
offers little recourse for other young people who find themselves out of work, due to the
inadequacies of the Spanish social safety net outside of the pension structure and, as will
be noted later in the chapter, unemployment protections that disadvantage entry-level
workers. For young people who find themselves in this unattractive situation, the most
common response is to rely on family aid. Indeed, the phenomenon of university-educated
workers forced to live with their parents has been noted by many observers (Bergareche,
2011). This resulting state of limbo endured by young Spanish workers wreaks havoc on
the prospects of young people and harms their ability to progress through traditional paths
to advancement that are enjoyed by youth elsewhere.
Some Spanish youths who find themselves out of work enter into a “black market”
for unemployment, informally offering off-the-books labor in exchange for payment,
without the protection offered to workers in the formal sector (Congregado et. al., 2010).
Despite the ominous-sounding term, this phenomenon typically does not encompass illegal
activities, but rather forms of labor that allow Spanish youth to avoid the pension
obligations of a contracted position. Many young Spanish workers take multiple forms of
part-time work, at a restaurant or a bookstore, for example, and pursue further education,
training, or search for a full-time contract (Dolado et. al., 2016). However, this ultimately
neglects the investment of time made by the worker into his or her education.
Finally, a number of Spanish youth have taken advantage of the free movement of
workers afforded to citizens of the European Union and have emigrated to countries with
greater demands for labor, such as Germany, England, the Netherlands, and Finland
14

(Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2014). Among those who remain in Spain, many choose to
migrate to the country’s larger cities, such as Madrid, Barcelona, and Seville, often with
only mixed success (Ayuda et. al., 2010). More jobs exist, especially for university
graduates, in the larger cities, but the crowding of the local labor markets means that urban
migration does not necessarily guarantee work for young people.
The Spanish welfare state fits with a Southern model of welfare that relies heavily
on transfer payments. This has resulted in a pension structure that disadvantages young
workers, a situation that is only likely to worsen as the national populations of Southern
Europe continue to age. The concentration of income maintenance spending, originating in
and better suited to a past era in which the Mediterranean family and religious authorities
were greater sources of public welfare provision, has crowded out spending on family
services and public housing, leaving some Spanish youth in a state of perpetual uncertainty.
Those unable to secure remunerative work often respond by taking informal or part-time
labor, migrating to a more thriving labor market, or simply enduring a scant unemployment
and relying on the support of family. A reform of the labor market in this regard would
surely be helpful to young entry-level workers.
Unemployment protections in Spain and attempts at reform
Having examined the legal pressures that weigh on the decisions of workers in
seeking and taking employment, it is worthwhile to analyze the strictures that influence the
hiring patterns of companies and which may incentivize or discourage a company from
taking on new employees. Specifically, it is valid to examine the status of unemployment
benefits and contract law in the Spanish state and what effects recent reforms in this area
have had on the situation faced by workers and employees.
15

In contrast to its universalist approach to pensions, the Spanish government ties
unemployment insurance definitively to one’s class of work and prior salary. This
inconsistency is sharp between different sectors of workers, with scrawnier benefits for
marginal workers but ample benefits for professional contract workers. Such a setup is
common across the industrialized world and is not necessarily burdensome for young
workers (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014). The logic behind this arrangement is
simple to understand: offering a share of an unemployed worker’s previous income as
unemployment benefits incentivizes that worker to reenter the workforce as quickly as
possible, and it would be unfeasible to promise all workers the same unemployment
benefits. For young people, this counters the disincentive to employment presented by the
pension system. However, as will be examined, the unemployment benefits promised to
entry-level workers brings unfortunate disincentives to employers: a new worker is
expensive to hire and easy to fire.
In the latter case, Spanish law guarantees up to 70% of one’s former salary in
unemployment benefits, largely covered by the former employer under normal
circumstances, for a period determined by the length of one’s employment (Arranz and
Muro, 2004). This ratio of unemployment benefits to salary is one of the most comfortable
in Europe, matching that offered in Scandinavia, and significantly higher than ratios of
60% in Italy and 53% in Germany (Keuschnigg, 2010). In addition, Spanish law does not
stipulate a time limit on the reception of unemployment benefits, rather using the
claimant’s length of employment as a determinant of one’s benefits eligibility period. For
example, prior to 2010, an unemployed worker of ten years could claim benefits for up to
fifteen months, rather than experiencing a cutoff in ten months (as in Sweden) or twelve
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months (as in Germany). The unusually generous nature of Spanish unemployment benefits
(especially compared to other Southern nations) makes the prospect of hiring a new
employee a bit riskier than in Spain’s neighbors. Because of this, the benefits system has
been blamed in recent years for some of the nation’s economic malaise and so attempts at
reform have been made recently, tying these changes to unemployment benefits to reforms
in Spanish contract law (Backus and Esteller-Moré, 2017).
The two most notable attempts at reforming the Spanish labor market took place in
2010 and 2012. The first reform, Ley 35/2010 (Law 35/2010), was adopted on September
17, 2010, by the governing center-left Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (PSOE in Spanish)
in an attempt to reduce the mounting unemployment rate, as well as improve their own
political standing prior to the 2011 national elections. Among the reforms introduced in the
bill were an obligation on employers to hire on a permanent basis those young people who
successfully complete a temporary contract after three years of working for a company. On
its surface, this part of the reform seems to allay some of the concerns about the contracting
system. However, it has proven to be a bit of a double-edged sword for young people.
Rather than ensuring full employment for young people who successfully complete their
contracts, it has given incentive to employers to exploit loopholes, such as firing a
temporary employee days before the conclusion of their contract and paying the associated
penalties rather than bringing on the worker on a permanent basis and being forced to
augment the employee’s salary and benefits. However, the 2010 law did increase the
penalty on companies that offer a series of temporary contracts to one employee, going
some way to ending the practice of firing and rehiring an employee on a temporary basis.
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In addition, the 2010 reform reduced the length of unemployment eligibility for all
employees from 45 days per year worked to 33 days per year worked, bringing Spanish
regulation in this area into alignment with that of most other European countries. The 2010
law also reduced the obligations experienced by companies to their fired workers if the
company had reported consecutive losses. Companies were also made newly able to fire
employees for missing 20% of workdays over a two-month period, a less stringent standard
than that which had previously been in place. Finally, the government created a fund to
help companies cover some of the indemnities faced by a company following the dismissal
of an employee, known in Spanish as the Flexiseguridad (Flexisecurity) program, inspired
by similar reforms pursued in Denmark in the mid-1990s and in Austria in 2006 (Muffels
et. al., 2014). Despite the fact that these reforms did reduce the responsibility of the firm
to its dismissed employees, thereby incentivizing firms to take the risk on more workers in
the long run, its provisions for employers did little to encourage hiring in the throes of an
economic crisis, lending instead to employers greater latitude in firing workers.
These muddled attempts at reform did little to curb rising unemployment among all
classes of workers and the national unemployment rate continued to rise following 2010
reforms. Partially due to public dissatisfaction with this situation, the center-right People’s
Party (PP) took power in December 2011 and initiated a second round of reform that was
introduced in March 2012, known as Law 3/2012. This round of reforms reduced the
mandatory severance payment to twenty days’ salary per year worked, further reducing the
protections enjoyed by workers. However, greater allowances were mandated for benefits
such as minimum paid absences; sixteen weeks are now permitted for maternity, fifteen
days for marriage, and up to a week for a relative’s death, depending on the circumstances.
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Among young workers, nevertheless, the legal situation improved little with this second
spate of new practices, as incentives were put in place for firms to hire older workers over
young workers (García-Pérez and Sánchez-Martín, 2015).
Unfortunately, it is infeasible to test the results of these reforms at the present time,
especially with data only extending through the end of 2016. Too little time has elapsed
since the passage of these attempted reforms for meaningful quantitative analysis to take
place. Were a researcher to revisit the question of the effects of reforms on Spanish youth
unemployment in a few years’ time, the question of what effect these reforms had could be
more satisfactorily answered.
Some of the tone-deafness to needs of young workers can be partially explained by
the political pressures faced by both of Spain’s major political parties, especially the PP,
which receives much of its electoral support from older voters. However, the reduction of
employment benefits and the lack of change for new workers brought about by the 2012
reforms did spark outrage among young people, culminating in the nationwide 15-M
protests in March 2014 (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). Historically, the widespread welfare
state, the role of the informal economy, and the important support offered within Spanish
families had softened the blow of unemployment for young people and mollified them to
some degree. However, during and immediately following the economic crisis, it became
clear that young people were no longer lulled into complacency by pared-back guarantees
of the state (Taibo, 2013). It is difficult to ascertain with present data what these reforms
have done to improve the odds of employment for young people.
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to examine empirically the current legal
situation of workers in Spain and compare it to that experienced by other European
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workers. The OECD calculates at intervals the degree of legal protection offered to workers
in a country, including collective bargaining rights, unemployment insurance, prevalence
of severance pay, and other factors, giving scores to countries from 1.0 (few protections)
to 3.5 (comfortable protections). Prior to 2010, Spain registered a score of 2.9, above the
average for a Western European country. Following the 2012 reforms, Spain’s score had
dropped to 2.0 for individual dismissals as of 2014, the most recent measurement. This is
significantly lower than other European nations, such the Netherlands (2.8), Germany
(2.5), and Sweden (2.4). Even among Southern European nations, Spain falls short in this
dimension, compared to neighboring Portugal, which scored 3.0, Italy and France, which
scored 2.6, and Greece, which scored 2.1 post-austerity (OECD, 2014).
In the years since the crisis, however, some analysts have commended the 2010
reforms as being necessary to make Spanish industry competitive in Europe (Guillén,
2013). The reduced “risk of employment” to firms has helped in some respects to reduce
the youth unemployment rate from its peaks, but there is little chance that this generation
of post-crisis workers will ever know the kind of protections enjoyed by their parents and
grandparents. In addition, rigidity remains in a labor market that is clunky and inefficient.
Therefore, it seems for the present as though the Spanish government has missed a golden
opportunity to pursue structural reforms and young people simply must make do with fewer
jobs and skinnier benefits.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are several structural barriers to employment for young people
in the Spanish state. The Spanish welfare state and pensions system, which shares traits
with other Southern models of welfare, is marked by its universalization of pensions as
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well as a reliance on a more diverse mix of public and private social service providers. The
system relies heavily on transfer payments and the subsidization of the retired by the
working, which bodes poorly for young workers, especially in Spain, which has a steeply
aging population. Likewise, the concentration of Spanish social spending in pensions and
other income maintenance programs draws resources away from some social services, such
as family allowances and public housing that are commonplace in the better-rounded social
safety nets of other welfare families. In Spain, the welfare system as it stands is less capable
of providing support to unemployed youth than those of its Northern neighbors, harming
their future odds of gainful employment (Bande and Karanassou, 2014).
Additionally, current Spanish policy toward unemployment offers mixed incentives
to hire and keep employees while pruning away prior protections that were previously
enjoyed by Spanish workers before the financial crisis. Given the current political climate
in Spain, it is unlikely that the prior protections will be tenably reinstated for present young
workers (Navarro, 2015). It can be best summarized, then, that the Spanish unemployment
insurance system is in a state of permanent austerity.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that there is definitely room for reform within
the Southern welfare model and even within the Spanish welfare state itself. In fact,
reforms pursued in Italy to that country’s pensions system by the second Prodi government
in 2007 and 2008 helped the nation more steadily weather the financial crisis and largely
avoid the string of defaults and stopgap funding measures that public providers faced in
Spain (Magone, 331). In the Spanish case, in order to ease the pressures faced by young
workers in the labor market, it is necessary for politicians to more squarely confront the
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problems posed by an aging demographic and take measures to counteract these
inconsistencies.
One concept that has been developed in the context of the Southern welfare model
in the past two decades is that of the “family-serving” welfare mix that takes into account
the changing nature of the Mediterranean family (Ferrera, 178). According to Ferrera, the
family-serving model consists of a mix of public regulations and incentives, corporate
arrangements, third-sector activism and private entrepreneurship to respond to the needs of
new families (particularly women and single mothers). In parallel with labor market
reforms introduced via social and territorial pacts, gradually establishing conditions of
flexible security in the labor market, easing mobility and reabsorbing marginal workers,
the family-serving mix may be a crucial ingredient for effectively reforming the Southern
type of welfare and even for turning it, perhaps, into a proper model. The welfare state has
been experimented with within the Spanish state in its regions of more devolved authority,
the Basque Country and Catalonia, as well as elsewhere in Southern Europe (namely, by
the Emilia-Romagna regional government in northern Italy) (Gallego and Subirats, 2012;
Longo et. al., 2015).
Dealing with labor market rigidity and underdeveloped protections for marginal
workers remains the biggest challenge to meaningful reform. As it stands now, young
people face great struggles in advancing their careers, maintaining steady employment, and
gaining a financial stability that is necessary to achieve their personal goals, such as
marriage, childrearing, and home ownership. The frozen welfare state of Spain (and, to a
certain degree, that of most of the Old Continent) stands in the way of greater worker
liberty. The realization of this form of social justice (in which people are free to pursue
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their own interests within their homeland) is essential if welfare systems of solidarity
characteristic of European societies are to be revitalized (Pisani-Ferry, 54).

23

Chapter II
Demographic Shifts in the Spanish Population and Its Relationship to
Entrepreneurial Activity
Introduction
Among the various demographic changes that have taken place in Spanish society,
one of the most visible is the steep decline in the Spanish birthrate (Martínez and Marín,
2014). Well into the 1980s, Spanish birthrates remained well above the European average.
A natalist social policy pursued by the Franco regime, coupled with traditional Catholic
teachings regarding contraception and family planning, ensured that the birthrate within
the country remained significantly above replacement rates into the 1980s. However, with
the collapse of Franco’s government and his particular brand of nationalism within Spain,
as well as a growingly irreligious population that disregarded dogmatic teachings on
sexuality, Spain quickly matched pace with its northern neighbors with respect to birthrates
and experienced one of the sharpest declines in fertility in Europe.
Accordingly, it has been suggested by some sociologists and economists that this
demographic malaise may have at least partially contributed to a decline in new economic
development within the country (Lacalle-Calderon et al., 2017). While the negative
relationship between economic development and fertility rates has been a concretelydemonstrated one in modern sociology, it is a novel inquiry to posit that, within a developed
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country, a gradual decline in fertility can ultimately harm economic development.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine empirically the causal relationship between
changes in the Spanish birthrate and the creation of new businesses, using nationwide data
from Spain since the year 1990.
In the examination of the dynamics of youth unemployment, it is generally
unhelpful to examine the direct effects of birthrates on youth unemployment in itself. It has
long been averred that a negative relationship between birthrate and youth unemployment
would be paradoxical (Blanchflower and Freeman, 14). This is not to suggest that such a
relationship is impossible, but rather that more thorough analysis might cause this
relationship to dissipate.
The logic behind such a relationship is this: in an economic model that is
experiencing diminishing fertility, successive generations of young people (dubbed for the
purpose of analysis as “cohorts”) will be smaller and smaller as a result. All other things
remaining equal, this would demand a lower mean unemployment rate among these young
people as fewer people compete over the same number of jobs and same quantities of
resources. However, there is a flaw in this logic. A priori, there is no reason to expect lower
unemployment as a result of lower birthrates. Job creation might decline because there are
fewer people to create them but the labor supply has also declined. The notion that the
number of jobs available remains constant is not necessarily true. It is for this reason that
business creation, measured as a calculation of the change in the number of total businesses
in Spain from the previous year to the period in question, has been chosen as a substitute
for youth unemployment in this chapter’s analysis.
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An explanation of this decision is warranted, as this variable is not necessarily an
intuitive indicator of youth employment status. However, it can nevertheless serve as a
useful stand-in once the unique interaction between the creation of new businesses and the
youth unemployment situation is accounted for.
In the first place, young Spanish workers are considered to be far more likely to
start new businesses and be more productive in their existing jobs than their older
counterparts (Ayala et al., 2017). This facet of job creation within the Spanish model may
be reliably attributed to a handful of key factors. In the first place, young people face fewer
economic entanglements. They are less likely to have held a long-term job and to have any
established loyalty to a firm than an older worker, making them more likely to strike out
on their own. Similarly, young people have fewer personal obstacles to starting their own
businesses. The average young person will not have a spouse or children to support, making
their decision to start a business less risky than that of an older worker with such personal
commitments. Finally, young Spanish people are possessed of less personal debt than an
older worker who has taken out loans for homes, cars, or any other encumbrance that would
serve as a roadblock to the creation of a new business (Fisher, 2013).
A secondary effect is that new businesses are generally more likely to hire young
people than established firms (Delfmann and Koster, 2016). This, too, can be attributed to
a pair of important factors. This is primarily due to the fact that young people will typically
accept a significantly lower salary and possess a skill level practically on par with older
workers in the same field. Additionally, adapting the perspective of a worker, a young
worker is more likely to choose to work for a new business that displays promise than an
older worker who desires stability over profitability in the latter half of their careers. In this
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way, the creation of a new business more directly impacts the employment situation of the
young worker rather than that of the average worker.
Hypothesis testing
In order to test empirically the relationship between fertility and business creation,
I have performed a series of time-series regressions using annual data available on business
creation, measured by the change in the number of businesses in the country for each year,
and the annual change in the birth rate per 1000 people twenty-five years prior to the time
period in question, so that the changes in cohort size measured are reflective of the change
in the number of young adults. In order to control for exogenous economic factors that
likely influence job creation far more than birthrate and comparative youth cohort size, I
have included annual GDP growth, in order to account for general economic trends within
the Spanish economy, average annual interest rate, accounting for the relative difficulty of
securing capital, annual inflation, and the Spanish labor regulations index, calculated by
the OECD, whose stringency measures the degree of legal protection a worker enjoys, with
a lower score representing a greater (more stringent) degree of legal protection offered to
workers.
In order to test empirically the relationship between fertility and business creation,
it is important to first deal with complications that arise from using time-series data, which
can reasonably be expected to be correlated across time. In order to counteract this
correlation, the regressions will be iterated across multiple periods. This will allow
significant effects to present themselves without spurious correlation among the
independent variables.
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It is also worthwhile to consider the manipulation of the birthrate data into a more
applicable form. Because the birthrate in Spain obviously declines seriously in the
applicable period, it represents a trend variable that is not mean-reverting, violating one of
the key assumptions of time-series analysis. Because of this, I have opted to use the yearon-year change in this variable, which eliminates the trend, provides the model an
assumption-satisfying mean-reverting explanatory variable, and otherwise largely
eliminates the need for more complicated analysis.
With all of these considerations, the resulting empirical model (known as model
2.1) is:
(2.1)

Businessest+h = β0 + βδbirthratet + βδGDPt-1 + βinterestt-1 + βinflationt-1 +
βlaborindext-1 + et+h

In this model, t is the time period, h is the number of periods iterated into the future (the
number of regressions performed), and β0 is a constant that represents the number of
businesses that would be created if the values of all other explanatory variables were set to
zero and the other beta-terms represent the estimated change in the expected value of the
number of businesses created (Businesses) if the value of the explanatory variable were to
increase by a single unit. e is the error term, representing the difference between the
predicted value for new businesses created and the actual value.
A key feature of this empirical model is the estimation of the effect of birthrates at
various times in order to capture the effect of changes in birthrate on business creation over
time rather than simply the immediate impact of these changes. This is done by setting the
independent variables besides birthrate at a lag of one period and predicting the rate of
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business creation several years into the future, then observing how closely these predictions
match reality.
Results
Performing the time-series regressions and examining the coefficients of the
independent variables yields some interesting results. First, the primary independent
variable of interest, birthrate, is statistically insignificant across all periods and has a
positive coefficient. Because of this, we can reject the notion that prior changes in birthrates
have a statistically significant effect on the number of businesses created in any given
period of interest. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as follows:
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Figure 2: Effect of a change in birthrates on business creation
The full results of the regressions may be consulted at the end of this thesis in a
table labeled “Regressions of Model 2.1.” The results of the control variables are found in
this appendix.
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In conclusion, then, changes in birthrates may be found to have a statistically
insignificant effect on the creation of new businesses. The expected immediate impact of
GDP growth (representing general economic trends) and interest rates are confirmed, while
the OECD labor index and inflation have no statistically significant effect on the creation
of new businesses.
Before leaving this section, it should be noted that once interest rate is dropped
from the regression model, it is possible to have a barely statistically significant effect (at
the 10% significance level) from changes in birthrate in the fourth future iteration.
However, though this coefficient is statistically significant, the coefficient is relatively
small, even in a regression fine-tuned to expose greater results. Therefore, some small
amount of a decrease in business development might be due to shrinking youth cohorts,
but it is neither statistically consequential nor metrically feasible to serve as a base of
analysis.
Interpretation of results
The most obvious interpretation of the trends observed in the model is that the
paradox described by Blanchflower and Freeman holds true within the Spanish model:
increasingly small cohorts of young people competing over the same resources are not
guaranteed to eventually secure more positive economic results for themselves. If changes
in the Spanish population pyramid do not have a measurable effect on business
development, then the spikes in youth unemployment would certainly suggest that any
relationship between youth cohort size and business creation is marginal at best.
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The demographic trend and smaller returning cohorts of young people can,
however, serve as a partial explanation of greater entrepreneurialism among the young,
who increasingly enter into informal and self-directed work, as was mentioned in Chapter
I (Serrano Pascual and Martín- Martín, 2017). At the individual level, a young person living
in the present day is more likely to be an only child than a young person who came of age
twenty years ago and will likely have attended less crowded schools and university classes.
Accordingly, a young person in such a situation (which we must assume is growingly
common in Spain) has access to more educational and financial resources than his
predecessors.
It should be noted that this recent increase in entrepreneurial activity is at least
partially due to the Spain’s adoption of the Euro in 1999 and the lower interest rates
experienced by borrowers in the country over much of the following decade. With the new
economic reality created for Spain by full membership in the Eurozone, the development
of new businesses and the securing of the sizable loans necessary for large-scale economic
activity became more easily-obtained, causing a massive boost in economic development
within the country (Neal and García-Iglesias, 2013). Therefore, it may be reasonably
inferred that the exogenous decision of the Spanish government to join the European
currency union has had a measurable effect on the attitudes toward and outcomes of
entrepreneurial activity in a relatively brief period. However, because all of the data in the
model used in this chapter comes from 1999 onward, in a period in which the Euro was the
accepted currency of Spain, this reality affects neither the veracity nor negates the
interpretation of the results found.
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This development among young people could go some way in explaining the
relative lack of youth protest and mobilization in Spain that has puzzled some political
scientists (Antentas, 2017). Beyond the highly-publicized 2011 anti-austerity protests in
which high unemployment was only one ingredient in a cocktail of complaints that
included government corruption, cuts to education spending, and bank failures, as well as
greater support among the youth for the newly-formed left-wing populist party Unidos
Podemos (Together We Can), young people have accepted largely docilely the superficial
worsening of their economic situation. Beyond some psychosocial explanations that are
beyond the scope of this chapter, such as an encroaching sense of hopelessness with regards
to traditional politics, the finding that the shrunken cohorts that are coming of age will
likely eventually secure an acceptable economic future can lend greater understanding to
this apparent passivity among young people toward their slipping economic position in
Spanish society.
In addition, as was mentioned in Chapter I, a third option has emerged in recent
years for those young people who lack the necessary economic resources to turn toward
self-directed economic activity and cannot afford to remain unemployed: emigration.
Many young Spaniards become low-income economic migrants to the more verdant
pastures of employment in northern Europe, particularly in Germany, Sweden, and Great
Britain (El País, May 6, 2014). Among those who stay in the country, home ownership and
the starting of families are also often postponed. These changing practices among young
people help us understand how they cope with the discomfort of the extended frictional
unemployment presently featured in the Spanish model, this phenomenon will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter III.
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We find that business creation has a unique interaction with the youth employment
situation. In Spain itself, a paradox surrounding the economic outcomes among smaller
youth cohorts is resolved: smaller cohorts are no more likely to generate greater economic
activity than larger cohorts. The potential negative economic disadvantages of slowing
birthrates seem to have been softened by a greater entrepreneurial activity noted among
young Spaniards, owing partially to the greater amount of resources allocated to members
of smaller cohorts on the aggregate, and the growing emigration of economicallydisadvantaged Spanish youth to other parts of Europe. However, it is unlikely that the
comparative benefits of a smaller youth cohort will be the experience of future cohorts that
are presently children as youth cohort size stabilizes. Therefore, while present young adults
in Spain should not necessarily participate in the popular pessimism over their overall
economic state, the same optimism should not necessarily be shared by the young people
who will succeed them in the university, in the workplace, and in the benefits lines.
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Chapter III
The Effects of Education on Youth Unemployment and the Outcomes of Tertiary
Education
Introduction
Moving on from these factors at play in the employment situation of Spanish youth,
the focus of this third chapter is the examination of the effects of changing educational
results and practices (both at the secondary and tertiary levels) on youth unemployment. In
addition, the results of study into these phenomena will yield some insight into patterns of
occupational outcomes following the conclusion of Spanish students’ education.
The reasons to examine this aspect of the Spanish youth employment situation are
twofold. The first and more obvious reason to study the effects of education on youth
unemployment is that educational background is the most reliable predictor of future
economic success experienced by a student or a worker. In studying the educational
patterns of Spanish youth, it is possible to determine correlation between variables of
education and variables of employment in order to seek an explanation from education of
prolonged high youth unemployment in the country. The second and less apparent reason
to study education as a potential variable in the determination of youth unemployment is
that the observation of trends in educational practices and outcomes over time allow a
researcher to observe how young people react to their concurrent economic situation while

34

still students and to measure whether or not these changed practices carry any meaningful
effect on unemployment within the youth population as a whole. It is with these dual
focuses in mind that I intend to test hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of Spanish
secondary and tertiary education with respect to youth unemployment.
Historically, Spanish youth suffered from a lack of competitiveness as a result of
various inadequacies of their nation’s educational system. Under the Franco regime,
nationalism trumped quality in Spanish curricula (Mar del Pozo Andrés and Braster, 2006).
For example, at a time when most European nations were implementing robust Englishlearning programs in their schools, the Francoist Ministry of Education sought to play up
Spanish as a crucial language and restricted foreign language education and exposure. It
was not until the passage of the General Law of Education of 1970 that the Spanish
government assumed an educational model similar to those of its neighbors (Payne, 565).
Given this piecemeal history of the Spanish educational system, it is unsurprising
that Spanish students lagged behind the rest of their European counterparts into the late
twentieth century. It is worthwhile, therefore, to examine whether or not this disparity has
contributed to the unprecedented spike in youth unemployment in the modern period. In
order to test any hypotheses related to this question, it is prudent to divide the focuses of
research into education along the lines of educational level; that is to say, to examine
separately the effects of changes in secondary educational patterns (those observed among
secondary or high school-age students) and tertiary educational patterns (those observed
among students at universities, vocational colleges, seminaries, or other postsecondary
institutions). Not only is this demarcation useful, given the different pressures and factors
faced by secondary- and tertiary-level students, but also yielding of more meaningful
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results as the researcher is more capable of zeroing in on causes and effects among the two
groups when examining their situations separately.
Hypothesis testing
The first hypothesis to be tested concerns the effects of secondary education quality
on the later employment outcomes of Spanish students. Specifically, the first tested
hypothesis postulates that a factor in higher Spanish youth unemployment has been
inadequate secondary education that leaves its graduates less capable of maintaining
employment upon reaching adulthood. In order to perform the necessary regressions to
isolate changes in youth unemployment that arise as a result of these changes in secondary
education, it is first necessary to describe the dependent and independent variables that will
be measured and regressed.
The dependent variable in this regression model regarding secondary education will
be youth unemployment. Among the independent variables selected for the model are four
primary variables of interest with relation to Spanish secondary education. The first of
these is the national average score on the PISA exam. The Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) is a standardized international measure of secondary-level
achievement, testing such subjects as verbal reasoning, mathematics, and science. The test
often serves as useful benchmark for academic progress at the national level, with higher
scores representing greater mastery of given subject material. Spanish students have
participated in the exam since its inception in 1999. Regressing changes in Spanish PISA
scores on the youth unemployment rate, therefore, promises to grant some insight into how
changes in student success translate into occupational success later in the students’ lives.
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A second independent variable chosen as a representative for secondary education
is the percentage of the Spanish federal government’s education budget allotted to
secondary education. I believe that is a superior measure of secondary spending than other
potential choices for independent variable (Euros spent per student, raw budgetary figures,
etc.). Beyond not being swayed by exogenous factors such as inflation and student
population, the variable of percentage of federal education budget focused on secondary
education allows the researcher to gauge more accurately the amount of emphasis that was
being placed on secondary education by education administrators and how this presence
(or lack) of focus on secondary education has impacted secondary students as they prepare
for the job market.
A third independent variable tied to a secondary education is the percentage of
students learning English at the secondary level. More specifically, the independent
variable chosen measures the percentage of students who achieve a bachillerato (similar
to an A-level in Great Britain or perhaps an A.P. certification in the United States) in
English or participate in intensive English-language education (which includes travel to an
English-speaking country as part of the education). While this variable might seem
somewhat arbitrary, it actually represents an important factor to the future success of a
student. In a global workforce (and in the European workforce, more specifically), Englishlanguage skills are required or encouraged for most white-collar jobs (Tabuenca-Cuevas,
2016). The ability or failure of a student to speak the language confidently can have
significant impact on their future success in the job market. The inclusion of this variable
takes this measure of linguistic capital into account and goes some way in measuring the
adequateness of foreign-language education in Spanish high schools.
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A final independent variable of interest that is not necessarily related to secondary
education but is nevertheless relevant to patterns of youth unemployment in present period
concerns the fortunes of the Spanish construction industry. Specifically, the variable in
question measures the number of housing starts undertaken each year in Spain since 1990.
In the past, during Spain’s economic boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, spurred by
the low interest rates afforded to consumers largely as a consequence of the country’s
participation in the Eurozone, builders went on an unprecedented construction spree.
During this period, wages were relatively high for construction workers and projects were
plentiful. As a result, a significant number of people (primarily young men) chose to forego
university or even drop out of secondary education without a certificate in order to pursue
lucrative careers as builders (Bielsa and Duarte, 2011). Since the beginning of the financial
crisis, however, it would be hard to imagine an industry harder-hit in the country than the
construction industry, the number of housing starts having petered from a peak of 747,000
in 2005 to a low of only 5,900 housing starts nationwide in 2015 (Ministerio de Fomento,
2016). This cratering of the construction market has deeply impacted youth unemployment,
and so in order to more fully capture the effects of changes in secondary education on the
youth unemployment situation, it is necessary to include a variable that represents the
vitality of the industry that drew so many dropouts and early leavers from the educational
system.
In addition to these variables regarding secondary education, there is a handful of
more “atmospheric” explanatory variables that, while not directly related to secondary
education, are necessarily included in order to capture a fuller picture of factors that inform
youth unemployment. These include change in GDP (representing the general trends of the
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Spanish economy), inflation (representing changes in the cost of labor), and the OECD
labor law index for Spain, representing the difficulty of hiring and maintaining an
employee as it relates to employment law (see Chapter II for a fuller explanation of this
measurement and its meaning). Finally, the independent variable of the EU-wide
unemployment rate has been added, representing the general trends of unemployment in
the European Union and seeking to capture the effect that extra-national trends might have
on youth unemployment in Spain.
The final model is as follows:
(3.1) Youth unemploymentt+h = β0 + βδGDPt-1 + βPISAt + βinflationt-1 +
βsecondary spendingt + βEnglish learningt + βhousing startst-1 + βEU unemploymentt-1 +
βlaborindext-1 + et+h
where t is the time period in question and h is the number of periods iterated into the future
(the number of regressions performed). An important part of this model is the estimation
of the effect of changes in education at various leads in order to capture the effect of
changes in PISA, secondary spending, and English education on youth unemployment over
time rather than simply the immediate impact of these changes. I set the independent
variables besides PISA, secondary spending, and English education at a lag of one period
and predict the rate of youth unemployment several years into the future. e is the error term,
representing the difference between the predicted value for youth unemployment the actual
value.
In addition, a second model must be calculated in order to measure the effects of
changes in patterns of tertiary education on youth unemployment. This model is
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remarkably similar to Model 3.1, with only some minor adjustments made to reflect the
difference between secondary and tertiary education. The general indicators of change in
GDP, inflation, EU-wide unemployment, and the labor index are included, as is the number
of Spanish housing starts. Likewise, in place of the measurement of secondary spending as
a percentage of the federal education budget, a model reflecting the effects of changes in
tertiary education on youth unemployment contains the equivalent variable that measures
tertiary spending as a percentage of the federal education budget.
The one major addition to Model 3.1 that differentiates it is the inclusion of a
measurement of the percentage of students in different areas of study at the university level.
Specifically, the model for tertiary education includes a variable representing the
percentage of students in the technical sciences and a second variable representing the
percentage of students in the humanities. The Spanish Ministry of Education defines
technical sciences as physics, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and engineering (though it
does not include health sciences pursued at the undergraduate level). Humanities,
meanwhile, include philosophy, religion, linguistics, classics, literature, and other liberal
arts that fall outside the realm of social science and law. The inclusion of such variables
yields a twofold benefit: beyond examining the direct effect of changes in preferred area
of study on youth unemployment, the inclusion of such variables allows some
understanding of the concentration of youth unemployment in different sectors of the
economy.
Consequently, the second model (hence known as Model 3.2) takes the following
form:

40

(3.2) Youth unemploymentt+h = β0 + βδGDPt-1 + βinflationt-1 + βtertiary
spendingt + βhousing startst + βEU unemploymentt-1 + βlabor indext-1 + βtechnical
sciencest + βhumanitiest + et+h
where t is the time period in question and h is the number of periods iterated into the future
(the number of regressions performed). This model predicts the rate of youth
unemployment several years into the future, then observing how closely these predictions
match reality. e is the error term.
Results
First remarking on the results of the regressions of Model 3.1, most of the variables
that display a concrete effect also display the sign and direction of effect that one might
expect. First, the variable of percentage of education funding at the secondary level carries
a statistically significant (t = - 2.71) and negative coefficient. However, this effect is
temporary. This means that youth unemployment is likely to fall as authorities place
additional focus on secondary education, at least for a short period. Going back to the data,
this helps to explain the trends observed in youth unemployment, as the percentage
dedicated to secondary education dropped steadily in the years preceding the crisis, from
46.78% in 1999 to 37.66% in 2009, according to the Spanish Ministry of Education. This
reduction in secondary spending goes some way in explaining the increased youth
unemployment over the same period. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped
graphically, is as follows:
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Figure 3: Effect of a change in secondary spending on youth unemployment
Similarly, the number of housing starts bore strong and negative correlation across
multiple iterations. This is to be expected, as the number of starts functions as a useful
proxy for the health of the Spanish economy as a whole, as well as reflecting the health of
the blue-collar economy inhabited by students that do not continue with their education
(Alonso-Nuez et al., 2015).
Surprisingly, the proportion of students engaged in English learning does not
possess a significant effect in any period. This may be attributable to the status of Spanish
as a major language. It is possible that students and young workers can still be
accommodated in speaking only Spanish, whereas a similar regression performed using
data obtained from speakers of a more minor European language (such as Hungarian or
Finnish) would demonstrate a greater economic gain from the same instruction in the
English language. It is worth noting that the percentage of students pursuing English
education has increased since the crisis, from 22.5% in 2005 to 42.9% in 2015. This
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suggests that young people increasingly see English-language education as a ticket to
greater economic success. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as
follows:

Effect on youth unemployment
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Figure 4: Effect of changes in English-language education on youth unemployment
Among the non-secondary-specific variables of interest, change in GDP has the
expected sign and strong statistical significance. More than any other variable, naturally,
the general health of the economy, reflected by GDP, demonstrates the greatest impact on
the youth unemployment rate’s spike at the time of the crisis and its subsequent
amelioration matches the economy’s slow recovery. Inflation also carries a statistically
significant and positive coefficient. The variable of European Union-wide unemployment
is also strongly significant (t = 3.21), suggesting that, to some degree, the fates of Spanish
workers and the Spanish economy are inextricably tied to the economic and business cycles
of its fellow EU members. While it has long been true that Spain’s economy was tied to
the strength of its trading partners on the continent (particularly France), the introduction
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of the European Union and the Euro have only deepened the level of economic
connectedness experienced by the country (Bastasin, 9). This fact has manifested itself in
the youth unemployment rate. The complete results of the control variables may be found
in a table labeled “Regressions of Model 3.1” at the end of this thesis.
Before moving on to the effects of changes in tertiary education, it is worthwhile to
remark on the PISA score. The model displayed a negative and statistically insignificant
immediate effect, but this coefficient builds into a small but statistically significant (t =
3.34) effect in the third iteration, however, this effect is extremely temporary, only
enduring one period. One fact is necessary to square these facts; because the PISA exam is
taken in the last year of high school, most of the students tested presumably do not enter
the workforce until at least four years after sitting the exam. This would suggest that higher
PISA scores only increase unemployment among young people of university age. This
could be because better secondary preparation leads more students to enter university rather
than vocational training and so those who exit university early (after two years) and enter
the job market suffer from slightly higher unemployment, despite their higher PISA score.
For the vast bulk of the students who sit the exam, however, the PISA results are
statistically insignificant at the time of entering the workforce, and so it can be said that
their secondary education has had no significantly positive or negative impact on their
employment prospects. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as
follows:
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Effect on youth unemployment rate

Dynamic effect of PISA scores (Model 3.1)
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Figure 5: Effect of changes in PISA score on youth unemployment
Moving to the regressions of Model 3.2, remarkably similar patterns are observed
in reflecting the effects of changes in educational patterns at the tertiary level. Coefficients
of almost-identical significance and size are attached to the variables of GDP growth,
inflation, housing starts, and the European Union’s total unemployment rate. The complete
results of the control variables may be consulted in a table labeled “Regressions of Model
3.2” at the end of this thesis.
Similarly, the number of housing starts bore strong and negative correlation across
multiple iterations. As mentioned above, the variable ebbs and flows with the general
health of the Spanish economy. The results obtained from these particular regressions aid
much in the explanation of observed patterns of youth unemployment. The catastrophic
state of the Spanish construction industry is reflected in the massive reduction in the
number of housing starts that has happened over the intervening period. This cratering of
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the housing industry helps to explain the swollen ranks of the young and unemployed in
the present period. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as follows:

Effect on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of housing starts (Model 3.2)
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Figure 6: Effect of a change of 100,000 housing starts
The variable for university spending was statistically insignificant across all
periods, suggesting that public expenditure at the tertiary level has no strong impact on the
employment prospects of these institutions’ graduates. The dynamic effect of the variable,
mapped graphically, is as follows:
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Effect on yotuh unemployment rates
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Figure 7: Effect of changes in university spending on youth unemployment
Among the two variables (humanities and technical sciences) designated to
represent the areas of study of Spanish university students, some interesting results cropped
up. Humanities was statistically insignificant across all periods regressed. This would
suggest that changes in the number and percentage of students in these more abstract fields
did not have any significant impact on the Spanish youth unemployment rate as a whole.
The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as follows:
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Effect on youth unemployment
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Figure 8: Effect of changes in humanities education on youth unemployment
However, the variable representing technical sciences was statistically significant (t = 2.25) and carried a negative coefficient. This suggests that students in the technical fields
in Spain are more likely to achieve a positive economic outcome following graduation
(Passaretta and Triventi, 2015). Looking at the data, this helps to explain some of the dip
in Spanish youth unemployment in the past six years, as the share of students in these
technical sciences rose distinctly in the years immediately following the crisis. It is likely,
then, that a degree in a technical field is seen as a surer guarantor of success in precarious
economic times than other forms of training (Pascual-Sáez et. al., 2016). The dynamic
effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as follows:
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Effect on youth unemployment
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Figure 9: Effect of changes in technical science education on youth unemployment
Interpretation of results
In viewing both the history of the Spanish educational system and the effects that
modern educational patterns have on economic outcomes of students, a narrative emerges
that serves to explain part of the modern phenomenon of high youth unemployment.
Historically, Spanish students suffered from an educational system that prioritized the
teachings of a clerical and nationalist state, to the detriment of the competitiveness of the
Spanish workforce. In this way, then, Spanish students stood at a distinct disadvantage
compared to their counterparts in neighboring countries (Giménez Martínez, 2014).
However, as Spain has modernized economically in the past twenty years, this
progress has been mirrored in their schools (Escardíbul and Villaroya, 2009). Higher
standardized test results herald the arrival of Spain into the European average and have
propelled many more students toward comprehensive university education (Egido and
Valle, 273). Unfortunately, due to the staggering economic downturn of 2007-2011, Spain
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and its workers have not enjoyed all of the economic benefits that would typically attend
such a string of educational improvements.
On the one hand, Spanish educational authorities, in placing additional emphasis
on university-level education and guaranteeing that tertiary education is available to almost
all students, have slackened off on some aspects of secondary education and allowed the
progress made in secondary education of earlier years to stagnate in the years following
the crisis (Egido and Valle, 275). This has meant that some subjects (such as foreignlanguage instruction) remain underdeveloped in Spanish schools by European standards.
Likewise, during the period of economic growth that characterized Spain in the
early 2000s, many young people (particularly young men) chose to exit formal education
in favor of pursuing low-skill employment that nevertheless yielded a sufficient income
(Alonso-Nuez, 3398). It is this segment of Spain’s youth population that now find
themselves thoroughly disenfranchised in a post-crisis Spanish economy. Without the
requisite academic background and technical skills to take modern middle-skill
employment and in the face of shrinking opportunities for meaningful low-skill
employment, many of these young people have formed a growing cadre known colloquially
in Spanish as the generación ni-ni (“neither-nor generation,” coming from a phrase
meaning “neither working nor studying”). In many cases, these young people find
themselves definitively shut out of ladders of opportunity open to their younger siblings. It
is this subset of the youth population that has fallen through the cracks of Spanish education
and into a trap of long-term unemployment or marginal employment that was unforeseen
ten to fifteen years ago.
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Among the vast majority of students who attend university, the trends of the general
economy are the strongest indicators of future economic success (though there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that these students will fare better than those who have only a high
school certification) (Corrales-Herrero and Rodríguez-Prado, 2016). However, a recent
uptick in the number of students engaged in the hard sciences suggests that these fields are
considered “safer” than more abstract areas of study.
In many ways, the changes observed in the trends of youth unemployment that arise
from changes in educational practice may be interpreted to some extent as the economic
growing pains experienced as the Spanish economy has shifted from its historical focus on
agriculture and manufacturing to a service-oriented economy (Teiqeiro and Solís, 2007).
While Spanish education has undeniably improved in the past twenty years as its economy
has modernized, it is also the case that these changes have shut out a dissatisfied slice of
Spanish youth who were permitted to neglect their education in more prosperous years.
Only time will tell if these young people will achieve the same long-term economic footing
enjoyed by their former classmates.
In conclusion, then, Spanish university education has done its part to improve the
economic prospects of its graduates. However, the secondary educational system in Spain
still leaves room for improvement, and those who fail to excel in the academic environment
find little recourse in a more white-collar Spanish economy. There are certainly steps that
could be taken to improve the collective lot of Spanish students with regard to the skills
requisite of a modern workforce, safeguarding Spanish youth against the ravages of another
recession. Whether or not these improvements take place will no doubt impact the future
development of the youth employment situation.
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Chapter IV
A Link Between Immigration and Youth Unemployment?

Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it has become a popular political talking
point in Europe to suggest that the large-scale migration taking place on the continent may
be at least partly to blame for national economic woes. At the political level, this has
resulted in the rise of a string of far-right and anti-immigration political parties and
politicians, as well as secessionist movements. Amid this rancor over the benefits and
drawbacks of immigration, Spain has been noticeably quiet, absent the large-scale backlash
against immigrants observed in neighboring France, for example. This is somewhat
surprising, given that Spain both continues to underperform economically and has been
one of the largest destinations for immigrants in the European Union. In concluding this
thesis, it is worthwhile to examine what concrete effect immigration has had on the
situation of young workers and whether or not the perceived ambivalence of the Spanish
public toward its immigration policies are rooted in reality (Izquierdo et. al., 2010).
In order to accomplish this analysis, this final chapter will primarily consist of two
regressions testing the relationship of immigration with two factors facing young workers:
youth unemployment and social capital. While the former of these factors is
uncontroversial, the reasoning behind an analysis of the relationship between immigration
and social capital deserves some explanation. One of the features of the Spanish labor
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puzzle informing youth unemployment is the presence or absence of a support network of
which a young unemployed worker may avail him or herself (Aguilar-Palacio, 2015).
These “ties that bind” members of a society to one another see their strength reflected in a
metric known as social capital (Villalonga-Olives and Kawachi, 2015). If the presence of
a large number of immigrants disrupts or erodes this web of assumed societal connections,
it is no stretch to presume that this mass immigration has worsened the situation of
unemployed young workers. Further explanation of the variables and methodology behind
these regressions will be included with the models used themselves. In addition, these
regressions and their results will be bookended by qualitative discussions about the history
and assimilation of immigrants within Spain. Understanding the role that immigrants play
in the Spanish labor puzzle helps us to understand more completely the pressures and
constrictions faced by young Spanish workers.
History of immigration to Spain
The development of Spain’s modern immigration policy has not followed the same
general trajectory as those of other European nations. During the Franco era, strict
limitations were imposed on both the number and class of immigrants who were permitted
to move to Spain (Encarnación, 2004). Because of this, the number of immigrants in the
country remained small into the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, Spain never developed a
formal system of inviting laborers from other countries to work in crucial but
underpopulated fields, as opposed to systems such as the Gastarbeiter program that was
constructed in West Germany during the same period (Plewa and Miller, 2005). Beyond
the ideological reasoning behind this decision, Spain also did not suffer from the population
shortages brought about in Northern Europe by the ravages of World War II and declining
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birthrates until much more recently. Following the death of Franco, a slight increase in
immigrants was noticed, but the majority of these immigrants came from former Spanish
colonial holdings in the New World (particularly Argentina and Mexico) and from some
neighboring countries in Europe (Escribano and Martínez-González, 2014).
However, Spain’s status as a homogenous nation of Spanish-born citizens was to
be short-lived. Following Spain’s entry into the European Union in 1995 and induction into
the common labor market in 1999, the number of immigrants entering the country annually
has steadily (and expectedly) risen, from 64,000 in 1998 to 343,000 in 2000, peaking at
934,000 in 2007 (Eurostat, 2017). Figures from 2015 would suggest that among the
country’s residents, 12.0% were born outside of Spain (Lacomba, 2014). The only other
European countries with larger populations born outside of Europe are Germany and
Sweden (Pflegerl, 197).
In present-day Spain, immigrants to Spain largely fall into two groups. The largest
group of immigrants to Spain consists of young and middle-aged low-skill workers and
their families who come from poorer countries in North Africa (particularly Morocco),
Latin America (particularly Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru), Eastern Europe (particularly
Romania, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine), and elsewhere, such as China and Nigeria (Álvarez
and Benlloch, 2014; Vázquez Silva, 2013). Of these, Romania and Morocco are the two
largest single producers of immigrants in Spain. This group of low-skill workers primarily
arrives in Spain having already secured a temporary contract of around two to three years
to work in the country in some fashion (Aznar, 2016).
The other sizable group of immigrants to Spain is composed of retirees from
Northern Europe, particularly Great Britain and Germany, who take advantage of the EU’s
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permeable borders and the lower cost of living in Spain in order to enjoy their twilight
years in the warmth of the Andalusian coastline. This second group, naturally, has little to
do with the situation of youth unemployment and so the bulk of my analysis will deal with
the trends observed among the first and larger group of migrants.
Before moving on to the regressions, it is important to note the ample legal
safeguards given to immigrants in Spain. Chief among these is the granting of Spanish
citizenship to the children of immigrants born in the country. These children are not
considered to be “immigrants” in the eyes of the Spanish state, but their legal status grants
their parents the right to stay in the country indefinitely (Ruíz de Huidobro, 2016). There
has been some objection to this national practice, and there are some who feel this situation
results in the underestimation of the size of the immigrant population in Spain (Cortina
Trilla et. al., 2008). Nevertheless, it is most applicable to measure the effect of new arrivals
to the country, because measuring the effect of the foreign-born population resident in
Spain fails to grapple with questions of assimilation and neglects the difference between a
recent immigrant and an immigrant who has lived in Spain for decades. With that in mind,
it is possible to examine the effect of new immigration on youth unemployment.
Empirically testing the relationship between immigration and youth unemployment
In order to test the relationship between new immigration and youth
unemployment, it is necessary to construct an empirical model that captures the various
factors affecting youth unemployment and accounts for extraneous factors driving changes
in the youth unemployment rate. In order to measure directly the relationship between
changes in immigration and changes in youth unemployment with a relatively simple
model.
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On the left side of the model as a dependent variable, very simply, is the youth
unemployment rate. On the right side of the model, representing the independent variables,
is a set of variables which are predicted to have some effect on youth unemployment.
Beyond a term representing the number of new immigrants allowed into Spain every year
being included as an independent variable, it is necessary to include a set of ambient factors
that clearly exert some influence over the youth unemployment rate. Similar control
variables are included in the regressions performed in Chapter II and Chapter III, which
offer more detailed discussions of the meanings behind these variables and the reasons for
their inclusions in a regression.
These more general variables include general economic growth (represented by the
change in GDP), the protections guaranteed to workers (represented by an OECD figure
that grants a lower number to represent greater protection of workers), the general rate of
unemployment in the European Union (representing continental economic cycles), the
number of housing starts pursued nationwide in a year in the country (representing the
health of the low-skill labor sector), and inflation. These non-immigration variables that
nevertheless produce some sort of effect on youth unemployment are set at a one-period
(one-year, in this instance) lag in order to counteract some of the complexities in dealing
with time-series data, allowing for the true and measurable effects on youth unemployment
due to immigration to emerge without worries of meaningless findings or spurious
correlations. The model will also be iterated across several periods, as was the case in
Chapters II and III, so as to capture any effects on youth unemployment caused by
immigration, not merely those immediate ones which appear in the first period.
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In the end, then, the model, known for purposes of clarity as model 4.1, used looks
something like this:
(4.1) Youth unemploymentt+h = β0 + βδGDPt-1 + βNew immigrantst + βinflationt-1 +
βhousing startst-1 + βEU Unemploymentt-1 + βlabor indext-1 + et+h
where t is the time period in question and h is the number of periods iterated into the future
(the number of regressions performed). A crucial facet of this empirical model is the
estimation of the effect of immigration in various periods in order to capture the effect of
changes in immigration on youth unemployment over time rather than simply the
immediate impact of these changes. This is done by setting the independent variables
besides immigration at a lag of one period and predicting the rate of youth unemployment
several years into the future, then observing how closely these predictions match reality. e
is the error term.
Results
Upon performing the regressions of this model, the effects of immigration on youth
unemployment become clear. In the third iteration, it becomes evident that the introduction
of a large number of immigrants into the Spanish labor market may have a severe and
negative impact on the prospects of young people to be employed. According to
calculations derived from model 4.1, the arrival of 100,000 new immigrants could raise
youth unemployment by as much as 5% in a following period. As will be explored more
thoroughly later in this chapter, many immigrants are pitted against young Spaniards for
entry-level work and that the Spanish economy, though rebounding, is not creating entry-
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level jobs rapidly enough to quell the competition between these two groups of jobseekers.
The dynamic effect of the variable, rendered graphically, is as follows:

Effect on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of immigration (Model 4.1)
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Figure 10: Effect of changes in immigration on youth unemployment
An interesting feature of these regressions is that this negative effect on youth
unemployment does not appear until the third iteration. This would imply that youth
unemployment is unaffected by immigrants immediately upon their arrival, but that
immigrants contribute to youth unemployment after two or three years in Spain. This would
suggest that, following the termination or expiration of their temporary work contracts, the
contracts that brought them to the country, foreign-born workers face significant hardships
in finding new work (Fernández Suárez, 2017; Rodríguez-Planas and Nollenberger, 2016).
Possible reasons behind this are several. First, and most basically, foreign-born
workers likely possess fewer of the necessary skills to achieve success in the Spanish labor
market (Muñoz de Bustillo, 2011). Not only are they less likely to be fluent in Spanish
(especially those hailing from the Middle East and Eastern Europe), these workers are also
58

less well-versed in the informal rules and norms that accompany employment and with
whose strictures only a native Spaniard would comprehend (Sanromá, 2015). In addition,
foreign workers are less likely to be aware of the services and opportunities provided by
both public and private entities to the jobless. Even if the foreign worker is aware that such
supports exist, he or she may feel less comfortable appealing of them for various reasons.
In addition, foreign workers, far removed from their families, friends, and hometowns in
another country, lack the informal support networks that often provide so many young
Spaniards with aid when they find themselves in between jobs.
Given the rigidity of the Spanish labor market (explored more thoroughly in
Chapter I) it is unsurprising that so many immigrants have a harder time gaining their
footing in the Spanish economy after their arranged period of employment ends. The
uncertainty of the Spanish economy strikes harder on immigrants; according to the OECD,
foreign-born workers in Spain suffer an unemployment rate of 27.1%, compared to the
Spanish average of 20.8%, as of March 2018 (OECD, 2018).
Not all of this change can be due, however, to the mere influx of immigrants who
have trouble remaining employed. An unavoidable effect of greater immigration is that of
labor market crowding, wherein young people newly must compete with more people for
jobs. Given the fact that many immigrants arriving in Spain for work are low-skilled
workers, it is not a fallacious leap to assume that the presence of a large pool of unskilled
workers set to compete with Spanish citizens for the same jobs will result in a tighter job
market faced by young people. Geography also plays a part, as both immigrants and young
Spaniards crowd to the country’s major cities (particularly Barcelona) from smaller towns
and poorer regions, shrinking further the pool of available work (Carrasco et. al., 2008).
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These cities, more prosperous post-crisis than other areas of the country, act as magnets for
the jobless. The lack of assimilation of foreign-born workers into Spanish (and, for that
matter, European) labor markets is a chronic problem (Moreno-Colom, 2016).
The complete results of this regression may be found in an index at the end of this
thesis in a table labeled “Regressions of Model 4.1”.
Empirically testing the relationship between immigration and social capital in Spain
A second and perhaps more interesting factor in youth unemployment whose effect
from immigration is unclear is that of social capital. As is expounded upon more thoroughly
in Chapter I, an important contributing factor which informs youth unemployment is the
degree to which unemployed young people may or may not have access to informal
networks of support from families, friends, churches, community organizations, and other
nongovernmental entities. However, these networks may only operate in the abundant
presence of social capital. Social capital is a tricky sociological concept that may be bestdescribed as the degree to which a citizen has reason to trust or aid an unknown fellow
citizen (Westlund, 2008). There is some research to suggest that a large influx of
immigrants disrupts the homogeneity of a settled population and that this ruptures the web
of social capital that had been established by centuries of conventional unity between
members of a society (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010). Whether or not this disruption has
occurred in the case of Spain is a worthwhile question and the focus of this second
empirical test.
Measuring social capital is a difficult task. For the purposes of empirical analysis,
I have chosen to use data from the World Values Survey, an international values poll that
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has been administered intermittently in Spain since 1995. Specifically, I have chosen the
percentage of the Spanish population that replied “yes” to the question “Can a stranger
generally be trusted?” as a variable to represent the amount of social capital present
between citizens. Upon examining the observations of the survey, the percentage of people
responding “yes” to this question has fallen from 32.7% in 2003 to only 19% in 2015
(World Values Survey, 2015). Clearly, this represents a significant decline in social capital
and, consequently, a more difficult situation for young workers who must, in the words of
Blanche DuBois, always rely on the kindness of strangers (Williams, 170).
But is this drop in social capital the result of increased immigrant presence in
Spain? In order to perform a regression on social capital, it is necessary to choose a set of
variables that capture other potential influencers on social capital. The most important
variable, and the variable of interest, is the number of new immigrants arriving in Spain
every year. Among the necessary control variables for this model are GDP growth and the
labor index representing the density of protections offered to workers. Research suggests
that economic growth aids in the development of social capital, leading citizens to feel
more positively about fellow members of their society as a whole, and so it is valuable to
include this as a control in the regression (Whiteley, 2000). Likewise, the degree to which
workers feel secure in their jobs plays a part in social capital, and so the labor index is
likewise included as a control variable.
In addition these established control variables, I have decided to include the GINI
index to represent income inequality in Spain. The inclusion of a proxy of income
inequality is necessary because greater levels of income inequality lead to greater levels of
social fragmentation and so reduce social capital (Ioakmidis and Heijke, 2016). Likewise,
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I have decided to include the homicide rate as a proxy for crime within the country.
Unsurprisingly, the presence of crime in a country does not aid in the development of social
capital, and so it is necessary to include as a control a proxy that represents the amount of
crime taking place in Spain.
In addition, two dummy variables have been added to the regression in order to
capture the effects that singular events may have had on social capital in Spain in the period
identified (1995 to the present). The first among these is joining the European common
market in 1999. Not only may this event provoke a sense of unity and belonging within
Spanish society, its inclusion also counteracts to some degree the impact that immigration
alone may have had on social capital, as larger-scale immigration would be an expected
consequence of membership within a union in which free movement of persons is
guaranteed. Methodologically, this is carried out by entering “0” for each year prior to 1999
and “1” for 1999 and all years following.
The second dummy variable, equally presciently, regards the massive Madrid train
bombings that took place in Spain in 2004. On the morning of March 11, 2004, a group of
radical Islamic terrorists set off ten bombs in crowded train stations around the Madrid area
at rush hour, purportedly with the goal of ending Spanish involvement in the War on Terror.
The bombings killed 192 and injured more than 2,000. Not only was this the worst terror
attack in Spanish history, but it remains the worst Islamic terror attack in Western European
history. Needless to say, this violent act may be expected to have had a deep impact on the
psyche of Spanish society. To capture the effect that this terror attack has had on the
presence of social capital in Spain, a dummy variable is introduced to indicate whether or
not an observation takes place after the Madrid train bombings. Methodologically, this is
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carried out by entering “0” for each year prior to and including 2003 and a “1” for 2004
and all years following.
In the end, then, the empirical model is as follows:
(4.2)

Social capitalt+h = β0 + βδGDPt-1 + βNew immigrantst + βincome inequalityt-1 +
βhomicide ratet-1 + βEU membershipt-1 + βlabor indext-1 + βterrort + et+h

where t is the time period in question and h is the number of periods iterated into the future
(the number of regressions performed). An important feature of this empirical model is the
estimation of the effect of immigration and terror in different years in order to capture the
effect of changes in these variables on social capital over time rather than simply the
immediate impact of these changes. I set the independent variables besides the number of
immigrants and terror at a lag of one period and predict the level of social capital several
years into the future. e is the error term, representing the difference between the predicted
value for social capital and the actual value.
Results
Upon performing and iterating this regression across multiple periods, it becomes
clear that terror, rather than immigration itself, is the biggest roadblock to the development
of social capital in modern Spain. The coefficient on terrorism is not only statistically
significant (t = -2.90), but also large enough to suggest that the terror attack alone may
have reduced the percentage of the public willing to trust strangers by as much as nine
percent. However, the effect was only temporary, affecting social capital only in the
immediate aftermath of the attack. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically,
is as follows:
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Dynamic effect of terror (Model 4.2)
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Figure 11: Effect of terrorism on social capital
The coefficient on immigration, meanwhile, offers a mixed but intriguing result. In
the first iteration, representing the immediate effect of the arrival of new immigrants,
immigrants have an insignificant impact on social capital, small enough that the arrival of
100,000 new immigrants would not be expected to move the metric of social capital by
one-half of one percentage point. However, after several years, the coefficient on new
arrivals is actually extremely small (0.007) and positive. This would suggest,
unsurprisingly, that immigrants are not accepted immediately upon arrival into Spanish
society and that some time is needed for both them and for their neighbors to adjust before
ultimately being successfully absorbed into broader Spanish culture. Nevertheless, it can
be comfortably stated that the increase in immigration has not led to a decline in social
capital in the Spanish case. The dynamic effect of the variable, mapped graphically, is as
follows:
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Dynamic effect of immigration (Model 4.2)
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Figure 12: Effect of changes in immigration on social capital
As expected, GDP growth and the labor index have statistically significant and
positive impacts on social capital. The complete results of these regressions may be
consulted in a table labeled “Regressions of Model 4.2” in an appendix at the end of this
thesis.
Before moving on, one methodological problem must be ironed out. In the initial
set of regressions, it appears that the coefficient on income inequality is positive and
strongly statistically significant (t = 4.40) in the later iterations. Not only does this
confound logic, but the mechanism by which income inequality may be expected to
enhance social cohesion is difficult to imagine. However, the data would suggest that
income inequality is a product of economic growth and its overlap with this positive
independent variable results in a false correlation with social capital presenting itself. In
order to examine whether or not this was a genuine effect, I detrended the regression by
adding the year as an independent variable and this removed the statistical significance of
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income inequality in almost every period, except for the last iteration. In this last iteration,
the coefficient on income inequality is only 1.65. Though this may seem significant, the
Gini coefficient only varies in Spain during this period between 34.35 in 2000 and 36.1 in
2015. The standard deviation of the metric for social capital is 6.61. Therefore, the change
in income inequality in the country could only explain a change of a bit less than half of
one standard deviation in social capital, meaning that this variable is not economically
significant. With this taken care of, this statistical anomaly is written off as a spurious
correlation.
Spanish reactions to immigration
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to observe briefly and qualitatively the reaction
among the Spanish public to the increased presence of immigrants in the Spanish
workforce. After all, if evidence can be found to suggest that the influx of large numbers
of new immigrants may be having a negative net effect on the ability of young people to
secure low-skill and entry-level work, one would suspect that a greater societal backlash
against this immigration would be seen. However, Spanish society has largely been absent
the kind of anti-immigration sentiment that has taken hold in Sweden, Germany, Great
Britain, France, and the Netherlands. One reason for this is the relatively comprehensive
assumption of immigrants into Spanish society, as has been demonstrated by the
regressions of model 4.2. A pair of additional reasons may also be identified.
In the first place, Spanish birth rates are far enough below replacement level to
necessitate the intake of a relatively large number of immigrants for two reasons. First,
these immigrants must take low-skill jobs for which Spanish young people are increasingly
ill-suited. In addition, the aging native Spanish population will not be capable of
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maintaining the welfare state that currently protects the elderly without an injection of
young citizens who will form a new tax base for an enfeebled Spanish populace (Sgritta,
123). These two pressures that make large-scale immigration necessary in the Spanish case
are visible in Spanish society. Public awareness of the necessity of immigration has muted
a Spanish backlash against immigration akin to what has come about in other European
nations (Benveniste and Pingaud, 2016).
In addition to this, the anti-immigration sentiment emerging elsewhere in Europe is
typically considered a far-right proposition. Proponents of limitation of immigration, such
as the National Front in France or the Alternative for Deutschland in Germany are
uniformly (and likely correctly) defined as far-right parties (Davies, 223). Persistent
memory in Spain of the cruelties and shortcomings of the Franco years make the odds of
such a far-right movement emerging in Spain slim, to say the least. Public conversation
regarding immigration and its impact are usually extremely civil and no voice in the
contemporary Spanish political landscape could be considered to be a far-right or antiimmigration force. The Franco era left a bitter taste in the mouths of Spaniards vis-à-vis
far-right politics and this has led to a great reluctance among politicians to condemn or
propose limitation of immigrants (Davies, 196).
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that some meeker attempts at
prioritization of Spanish citizens over immigrants have been brought into the public square
in recent years. The Ciudadanos (Citizens) party, which was founded in 2005 and entered
parliament for the first time in 2015, has been described as both a center-right and a centerleft party in Spanish media and has an observably populist streak within its policy platform
(Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2014). Since 2015, parliamentarians belonging to the
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party have suggested banning immigrants from taking advantage of some welfare programs
available to ordinary Spanish citizens, as well as suggesting that Spanish citizenship law
should be more strictly circumscribed (El Critic, November 26, 2015). In addition, in
Catalonia, a more extreme far-right regional party, known as Plataforma per Catalunya
(PxC; Platform for Catalonia) has emerged. Barcelona is a major center for immigration to
the country and PxC has responded with demands for limitation and deportation of
immigrants, even calling on supporters to vandalize Arab-owned stores and mosques in
2011 (El Pais, August 25, 2011). While historically marginalized in Catalonian politics,
PxC has gained a handful of city council seats in the region in the past few years and the
terror attack in Barcelona that occurred in August 2017 has fueled new calls by the party
to limit immigration. Whether or not this populist discontent with elements of mass
immigration will mature into a more full-throated movement to curtail immigration into
the country, following the pattern set in other countries, remains to be seen.
Conclusion
In the past eighteen years, since its admission into the European Union, the Spanish
demography has been significantly altered by the presence by the growing presence of
migrants, many of whom arrive in the country in order to work and so have the capacity to
alter the forces affecting the Spanish labor market. Because of this, it is a worthwhile
question to ask how this shift in the Spanish labor market has affected young workers in
particular. In addition, it is possible that the presence of foreigners in Spanish society has
had a deleterious effect on the social fabric that provides support to the unemployed,
including unemployed young people, adding a secondary dimension to the effect of
immigration on youth unemployment. In order to empirically measure the effect of
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immigration on these forces on youth unemployment, it is necessary to construct timeseries regressions that regress these and other factors on the youth unemployment rate.
Observing the results of these regressions, it can be stated that immigration has had
a statistically significant impact, worsening youth unemployment in the country. This is
unsurprising, as immigrants and young Spaniards are both concentrated within low-skill
and entry-level work, as well as geographically concentrated in the labor markets of large
cities. However, the cause of this friction is not as simple as first glance would suggest.
The negative impact of immigration on youth unemployment only arises after two or three
years, implying that the Spanish labor market poorly integrates immigrants and offers them
little opportunity to advance after their first employment has ended. In addition, legal
protections offered to immigrants protect them in many cases from swift deportation,
leading to a glut of low-skill labor (Carrasco Carpio, 2016).
Along the dimension of social capital, immigration cannot be stated to have had an
impact on Spanish society at the present time. The decline in social capital over the past
twenty years is better explained by other events impacting Spanish culture, particularly the
terror attacks suffered by citizens of Madrid in 2004, as well as other broad sociological
trends, such as the financial downturn and the rise of an increasingly anonymous Internetbased culture in the same period (Bauernschuster et. al., 2014). Because of this lack of
impact, it cannot be stated that the informal networks that offer support to young
unemployed people have not been eroded by the increased presence of immigrants in
modern Spain.
Despite the negative impact that immigration has presented to Spanish youth, there
has been little of the backlash against immigration so commonplace in the rest of Europe.
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Part of this has to do with the lingering disdain for the political philosophy of Franco and
a public aversion to far-right politics that has kept politicians from taking up the issues of
immigration seriously, much less proposing a ban or limits on immigration. However, a
rising younger generation of policymakers, such as members of the Ciudadanos party, is
somewhat more vocal in expressing discomfort with current levels of immigration.
Whether or not this trend will continue will likely hang upon the economic fortunes of
Spain moving forward.
In conclusion, the success of immigration in Spain is largely concentrated in the
ability of society to absorb immigrants with the understanding that migration, particularly
of young workers, is necessary for the perpetuation of an aging Spain. However, the
Spanish labor market has a long way to go in the acculturation of immigrant workers, with
immigration currently placing an undue burden on young workers, a fact that is not
unnoticed among young people and their political representatives. How Spanish
policymakers deal with these questions of assimilation and unemployment will decide the
tone of Spanish politics and deeply impact the lives of the migrants and their children who
presently call Spain “home.”
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Conclusion
The question of how to maintain economic dynamism in an advanced country is a
crucial question with no clear answers. As has been cited in this thesis, the issue of youth
unemployment touches on a wide array of contingent issues, such as politics, culture,
immigration and migration patterns, education, and even the demographics that will govern
Spain’s future. How to go about unblocking the labor market puzzle in Spain first requires
an understanding of the causes behind high mean youth unemployment in the wake of the
financial crisis. A thorough and empirical analysis of potential causes, provided by this
thesis, hopefully will serve as a groundwork for further exploration of the problems facing
young Spanish workers and of possible solutions that will be helpful for the Spanish case
and perhaps those of other developed Southern European nations.
In Chapter I, a brief description of the history and construction of the Spanish
welfare state was provided in order to examine the legal situation of the unemployed in
Spain. Presently, some serious roadblocks exist for young people in Spain. The Spanish
welfare state relies strongly on transfers and the subsidization of the retired by the working.
This bodes poorly for young workers in country with an aging population. In Spain, the
welfare system is less capable of providing a well-rounded support to unemployed youth
than its northern neighbors.
Additionally, current Spanish policy toward unemployment protections offer few
incentives to firms to hire and keep employees while scaling down protections previously
enjoyed by Spanish workers. Reforms embarked upon in 2010 and 2012 have done
relatively little to solve underlying problems of labor market rigidity and lighten the
permanent austerity experienced by young people. Spanish politicians have yet to squarely

71

confront the problems presented to young people by government policy. More data
regarding the effects of the 2010/2012 reforms would be useful in determining what effect
these laws have had on youth unemployment.
In Chapter II, the focus turned to an empirical analysis of the effects that
demographic change (particularly shrinking birthrates) have had on Spanish economic
productivity, searching for a connection between declining fertility and economic malaise
that has been conjectured by some analysts. In the results, we find that business creation
has a unique interaction with the youth employment situation. A paradox conjectured
surrounding the economic outcomes among smaller youth cohorts is resolved: economic
activity does not depend on the size of a generation of young people. The economic
disadvantages of slowing birthrates seem to have been softened by a greater entrepreneurial
activity, owing partially to the greater amount of resources allocated to modern young
people, and the growing economic emigration of Spanish youth to other parts of Europe.
However, it is unlikely that any benefits of a smaller youth cohort will continue to be the
experience of future cohorts.
In Chapter III, the link between educational patterns and youth unemployment in
Spain is examined. In surveying the Spanish educational system and the effects that modern
education has on the economic outcomes of students, a story explaining high youth
unemployment presents itself. Historically, Spanish students lagged behind their
neighbors. However, modernization has helped somewhat to close this gap. Unfortunately,
due to the staggering economic downturn of 2007-2011, Spain and its workers have not
enjoyed the prosperity that these improvements usually promise and some subjects (such
as foreign-language instruction) remain underdeveloped in Spanish schools. Likewise,
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Spain’s early-2000s boom, many young men chose to exit formal education to gain
lucrative employment in the construction sector, young workers who now find themselves
deeply disadvantaged without the academic and technical background necessary to
succeed.
In the final chapter, the relationship between immigration and youth unemployment
is examined, tackling a thorny political and cultural question with which other European
countries are presently struggling to grapple. The Spanish population has been altered by
a growing number of migrants, many of whom arrive in the country to work. This wave of
immigration can be found to worsen young people’s outcomes in the labor market. The
Spanish labor market as it stands also poorly integrates immigrants and gives them few
opportunities after their initial employment has ended. Further study at the regional level
would be useful in examining the labor market crowding that is observed in these cases.
Along the dimension of social capital, immigration cannot be stated to have had an
impact on Spanish society at the present time, and the decline in social capital in recent
decades is better explained by other factors, such as terrorism and a shifting culture. The
informal networks that offer support to young people have not been significantly eroded
by the increased presence of immigrants in Spain.
Despite the negative impact that immigration has presented to Spanish youth, there
has been little backlash against immigration. However, a rising younger generation of
politicians, such as the Ciudadanos party, has become growingly vocal in calling for lower
levels of immigration. Whether or not this trend continues will likely depend on the
economic fortunes of Spain moving forward.
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Once all of the data are processed and analyzed, a picture emerges of the challenges
to the Spanish youth labor market. The Spanish government over the past fifteen years has
consistently mishandled the challenge of youth unemployment and missed opportunities to
aid young workers. The educational shortcomings presently experienced in the country
threaten to undercut the progress of prior decades and make Spanish youth less competitive
in a continental and global job market. Not only this, but the legal structures surrounding
hiring and unemployment in Spain do a disservice to young workers. Moreover,
immigration into the country has created a glut of low-skill labor in major cities that
disproportionately harms young Spaniards. Though Spanish youth have responded with
ingenuity, pursuing higher education and taking more economic initiative upon themselves,
their positions in the economy and in society seem to be precarious and marginalized. All
of these factors combine to mean that more young Spaniards than in prior generations will
face serious roadblocks to long-term employment, starting their own families, and pursuing
for themselves the happiness promised to them by a slipping developed economy. The
greatest tragedy of this state of affairs is not an economic one, but an individual one marring
the lives of each resident of the benefits line.
Anyone who knows me knows that I am an avid cinephile, and so I think it only
appropriate to conclude this work with a quote from a film. In his 1958 classic Touch of
Evil, Orson Welles plays a corpulent and corrupt border-town sheriff, Hank Quinlan, who
attempts to double-cross Mexican official Miguel Vargas (played by Charlton Heston).
Over the course of the film, the disheveled Quinlan pays a visit to a local brothel owned
and operated by the comely Madam Tonya (played by Marlene Dietrich), who fancies
herself an amateur fortune-teller. Quinlan pays her to have his palm read and, after laboring
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over the lines of his palms, she gives him the ominous and classically noir line, “I can’t
read your palms. Your future has been all used up.” For Spanish youth, this is an
uncomfortably familiar feeling.
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Figure 1: Youth unemployment rate in Spain, compared with those of other nations
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Figure 2: Effect of a change in birthrates on business creation

Dynamic effect of PISA scores (Model 3.1)
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Figure 3: Effect of a change in secondary spending on youth unemployment
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Dynamic effect of secondary spending (Model
3.1)
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Figure 4: Effect of changes in English-language education on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of English-language education
(Model 3.1)
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Figure 5: Effect of changes in PISA score on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of university spending (Model 3.2)
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Figure 6: Effect of a change of 100,000 housing starts
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Dynamic effect of technical science education
(Model 3.2)
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Figure 7: Effect of changes in university spending on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of humanities education (Model
3.2)
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Figure 8: Effect of changes in humanities education on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of housing starts (Model 3.2)
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Figure 9: Effect of changes in technical science education on youth unemployment
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Dynamic effect of immigration (Model 4.1)
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Figure 10: Effect of changes in immigration on youth unemployment

Dynamic effect of terror (Model 4.2)
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Figure 11: Effect of terrorism on social capital

Dynamic effect of immigration (Model 4.2)
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Figure 12: Effect of changes in immigration on social capital
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